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RECENT CASES
Kentucky, unlike some other states,15 has not limited the authority
to halt drivers under the display statutes to the state police. It seems
that this would be further protection. Due to the superior training
and selection practices employed by that agency, as well as their
uniform operation and statewide control, these officers should be less
likely to conduct an illegal search.
In the pnncipal case the court was confronted with the problem
of balancing relative interests. On one hand was the question of
whether to encroach on the liberties and freedoms of motonsts; on the
other was the question of how to make the highways safer for motorists.
It seems that a sound decision was reached by the court. As a result of
modem vehicle operation, thousands of lives and dollars are lost an-
nually on the public highways largely because of incapable drivers.
Presumably, many of these incapable drivers are unlicensed. If these
dnvers are excluded from driving on the highways, this will have the
effect of reducing the number of highway accidents.
The effect of the holding in the pnncipal case is to impose
another of a growing number of restraints upon a citizen's nght to free
movement.16 While it may be only a minor inconvenience in most
instances, the present Kentucky statutory provisions allow a possibility
for the arbitrary and unrcasonable exercise of police powers. To curtail
this possibility, it seems that the display statute should be re-drafted to
include a short time period before charges can be brought under it and
to limit the authority to set-up these road blocks to the Kentucky State
Police.
H. Hamilton Rice, Jr
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN EMPLOY-
MENT CORONARY OccLUSION.-Claimant, employed as a loader operator
in a coal mine, became ill while at work. He was having difficulty
breathing because of smoke blown upward through the mine spaces
from a burning cable. An ensuing examination disclosed artenosclerosis
and a myocardial in farction, but this heart condition had developed
over a number of years. The claimant offered medical testimony that
the smoke from the burning cable and the stress of the work tnggered
the attack. The defense offered medical testimony that this heart
attack would have or could have occurred irrespective of the stress, but
did not deny that the work or conditions under which it was performed
15 See Tenn. Code Ann. §59-709 (Supp. 1962).16Another example of restraint upon freedom of movement can be found in
KRS 433.236 which allows a peace officer or a merchant to detain one
whom he has probable cause to believe is a shoplifter.
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may have contributed in some way to the attack. The Workmen's
Compensation Board dismissed the claim and claimant appealed. The
circuit court remanded with directions to compensate claimant. Appeal
was then taken to the Court of Appeals. Held: Affirmed. "When the
responsive effort demanded of an employee's physical mechanism in
order to do his work contributes to a seizure that would not have
occurred at that time except for that effort however easy and routine
it may be, the resulting disability is in some degree attributable to the
work and is compensable."' Johnson v. Stone, 357 S.W.2d 844 (Ky.
1962).
The Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act provides that a
claimant must show- (1) traumatic injury by accident, and (2) causal
connection between the work and the injury before receiving com-
pensation for accidental mjury. 2 As to the first requirement, the Court
of Appeals has held that competent medical testimony establishing that
the exertion from a specifically identified effort contributed to a dis-
abling heart attack will support a finding of accidental injury,3 and that
such an injury is traumatic. 4 As to the second requirement, the Court
of Appeals has formulated in the pnncipal case a test for determimng
causal connection between the work and the cardiac disability as fol-
lows: "[D]id the work or conditions under which it was performed
contribute in any way to the attack?" 5 If the question is answered in
the affirmative, compensation is awarded on the basis of the propor-
tionate contribution of the injury to the disability.
The Court of Appeals has defined workmen's compensation as
being designed to indemnify an employee from financial loss resulting
from exposure to industrial hazards.6 The rationalization is that such
injunes are part of the cost of the product. But more than one-half of
all deaths in the United States result from cardiovascular diseases, and
these deaths may occur when the victim is completely at rest.7 Taking
this factor into consideration it is difficult to reconcile the test for
causation formulated in the pnncipal case with the generally accepted
definition of the scope of workmen's compensation legislation.8 The
1 Johnson v. Stone, 357 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Ky. 1962).2 Ky. Rev. Stat. [hereinafter referred to as KRS] 342.005(1).
3 Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1960).4 Gnmes v. Goodlett, 345 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1981).
5 Johnson v. Stone, 357 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Ky. 1962).6 Tyler-Couch Const. Co. v. Elmore 264 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1954).7 nAmencan Heart Assocation, Cardiovascular Diseases in the United States,
Facts and Figures (March 1958).8 
"Workmen s compensation is a mechanism for providing cash wage benefits
and medical care to victims of work-connected m)unes, and for placing the cost
of the injuries ultimately on the consumer 1 Larson, Workniens Corn-
pensation Law §1.00 (1952).
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fact that cardiovascular diseases account for such a high percentage of
deaths seems to indicate that disability or, death resulting from
cardiovascular disease does not usually result from an industrial hazard.
This type of disability would better fit into the category of hazards to
which the general public is ordinarily exposed. If the type of injury
sustained in the principal case becomes compensable then workmen's
compensation is no longer a device for compensating injunes resulting
from employment but becomes insurance. Such compensation cannot
be rationalized as part of the cost of the product.
To show causal connection between the work and the disability in
Kentucky, the claimant must prove that the injury- (1) arose out of,
and (2) occurred in the course of employment.9 The court in the
principal case looked only to the "in the course of" requirement. With
reference to causation the court stated that, "[VV]hat we want to know
is whether it is likely that the work had anything to do with bringing
•ora the attack at the particular time in question."' 0 This refers only to
the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred,
i.e., "in the course of."-"
In a recent case the Court of Appeals expressed its view regarding
the "arising out of" requirement its as follows:
The phrase arising out of employment refers to cause of accident and
requires a causal relationship between accident and employment, and
the test of whether accident arose out of employment is whether cause
of accident had its origin in a risk connected with employment and
injury flowed from such source as a natural and rational consequcnce.12
In determining whether the injury flowed from risk comcected wiLI
employment courts generally look to see whether the claimant was
subjected to an unusual straina13 or a risk peculiar to the employment.' 4
The court in the principal case did not require anything unusual or
peculiar to the employment in order to establish causal connection.
This failure to satisfy the "arising out of" requirement in effect over-
9 KRS 342.005(1).
1o Johnson v. Stone, 357 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Ky. 1962).
11 "As used in Compensation Act ansing out of' refers to origin or cause of
inury, and 'in the course of refers to the time, place, and circumstances underwhich injury occurs, so that an injury occurring m course of employment may,
but need not necessarily, anse out of employment; whereas an injury arising out
of the employment, almost necessarily occurs in the course of it." W T. Congleton
Co. v. Bradley, 259 Ky. 127, 81 S.W.2d 912 (1935).
12 City of Prestonsburg v. Gray, 341 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1960).
is Unusual is used here m relation to the "arising out of' requirement.
Larson discusses the unusual exertion cases under the accident requirement;
however, he also points out that the problem is really one of "arising out of'
i.e., causal connection between the employment and the injury. 1 Larson op. cit.
supra note 8, §38.81.
14 See generally, 58 Am. Jur. Workmens Compensation, §257 (1948).
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rules a long line of Kentucky cases holding that the terms "ansing out
of" and "in the course of' are not synonymous and that both must be
present to allow recovery.15
The court could have reached the same result in the pnncipal case
without such broad extension of workmen's compensation coverage.i6
The testimony of one of claimant's physicians, which the court appar-
ently ignored, was that breathing of air contaminated by smoke fumes
would be a factor conducive to the type of attack suffered by claimant.' 7
This is sufficient to satisfy the "arising out of" requirement in that the
smoke is not a strain or nsk to which members of the general public
are ordinarily exposed. In light of this the court should have asked
whether the disability resulting from a pre-exiasting disease was pre-
cipitated by either a risk peculiar to the employment of the claimant
or unusual strai.1s The court could have found such a nsk in the
smoke fumes. This would avoid the extension of workmen's compensa-
tion coverage to include any disability resulting from any effort expended
while at work, however easy and routine it may be, and at the same
time apply a test which satisfies the requirement that the injury anse
out of the employment.
Roy Edward Potter
15 Masomc Widows and Orphans Home v. Lewis, 330 S.W.2d 103 (Ky.
1959); Maddox v. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., 329 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1959).
Wilde v. Umversity of Louisville, 327 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1959); Stapleton v. Ford
Junction Coal Co., 247 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1952); Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollen-
bach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W 152 (1918).
16For support of this extension see Note, 49 Ky. L.J. 394 (1961). Contra:
Comment, 50 Ky. L.J. 415 (1962).
17 Johnson v. Stone, 857 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Ky. 1962).
18 Thefollowing hypothetical situation should clarify the suggested interpreta-
tion of "unusual" as app ied to the "ariig out of' requirement. A, employe as a
fireman on a steam engine, suffers a heart attack while shoveling coal into the
engine, and it it shown that the heat and stress of the work precipitated pre-
existing disease into disability. Recovery should be allowed because the general
public is not exposed to tis type of strain. Unusual strain should not be defined
as unusual for A, but unusual as compared with the strain to which the general
public is exposed. On the other hand, B, employed as a drug store clerk, who has
a heart attack while ringing up a sale on a cash register, should not receive
compensation even if it is shown that the disability was precipitated by the
strain of ringing up the sale. Tis strain is not unusual as compared with the
strain to which the general public is exposed.
